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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CALIFORXIA PACI~IXG CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
YS. 
IXDlTSTRL-\.L CO~I~IISSIOX OF UTAH, 
and JUAXITA LE\VIS JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATE~IENT OF THE CASE 
No. 6305 
This is an original proceeding in this court for the 
purpose of reviewing an award made by the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah against this plaintiff 
and in favor of Juanita Lewis Johnson, and the findings 
and conclusions of said Commission upon which said 
award is predicated, dated July 29, 1940, in the m~tter 
designated by said Commission as Claim No. 4270. After 
petition for rehearing had been duly filed by the plain-
tiff herein within the time allowed by law, and after the 
same had been denied by the Commission,- plaintiff here-
in, within due time, applied to this court for the issuance 
of a writ of certiorari, which writ was issued by this 
court, and to which writ return has been made to this 
court. 
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It having been admitted that J. Frank Johnson, the 
deceased, suffered injuries arising out of and in the 
course of his employment with the plaintiff, and that 
from said injuries he subsequently died, there is no ques-
tion but that his widow, Juanita Lewis Johnson, is en-
titled to benefits for herself and minor children. This 
case, accordingly, involves the sole question as to the 
extent of the benefits the said Juanita Lewis Johnson 
is entitled to for herself and said minor children. 
The Commission awarded benefits to her in the sum of 
$21.84 a week. It is the contention of the plaintiff that 
there is no evidence to support the award of the Com-
mission in such an amount per week, and that the uncon-
tradicted evidence shows that the award should not have 
been in any sum greater than $19.73 per week. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
While this matter was pending before the Commis-
sion the respective parties filed with the Commission an 
agreed statement of the material facts, and submitted 
the matter to the Commission for decision upon such 
agreed statement. By such statement the following facts 
were agreed : 
1. That the deceased died as a result of an injury 
suffered by him on October 13, 1939, while in the course 
of his employment with the plaintiff. 
2. That at the time of his injury and death, his wi-
dow, the defendant, Juanita Lewis Johnson, and eight 
minor children were wholly dependent upon him for their 
support and maintenance. 
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3. That plaintiff wn:-; subject to i lw \Vorkmeu '~ 
Compensation ~\d of Utah, and that it W:ls a sPlf-insurPr. 
-±. That plaintiff operated it:-; business eaeh week from 
the "·eek ending October 8, 1939, to the wPek ending Oc-
tober 1--l-, 193~1, the follo"·ing number of da~'s: 
\Veek ending October 8, ln:)8, 5-1/:! days. 
\Veek ending October 15, 1938, 5112 days. 
\Veek ending Odober 22, 1938, 5112 days. 
\Yeek ending Oetober 29, 1938, 5112 days. 
\Y eek ending X ovember 5, 1938, 51h days. 
\V eek ending November 12, 1938, 5112 days. 
\Veek ending X ovember 19, 1938, 5 days. 
\V eek ending X ovember 26, 1938, 5 days. 
\V eek ending December 3, 1938, 5 days. 
\Y eek ending December 10, 1938, 5 days. 
\Y eek ending December 17, 1938, 5 days. 
\Y eek ending December 24, 1938, 5 days. 
\Y eek ending December 31, 1938, 6 days. 
\Y eek ending January 7, 1939, 5 days. 
\Veek ending January 14, 1939, 5112 days. 
\Yeek ending J anuery 21, 1939, 5 days. 
\V eek ending January 28, 1939, 5 days. 
\\T eek ending February 4, 1939, 5 days. 
\Yeek ending February 11, 1939, 5 days. 
\Y eek ending February 18, 1939, 5 days. 
\Veek ending February 25, 1939, 5 days. 
\Veek ending ~larch 4, 1939, 5 days. 
\V eek ending :March 11, 1939, 5 days. 
\\T eek ending 1\Iarch 18, 1939, 5 days. 
\Veek ending March 25, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending April 1, 1939, 5112 days. 
vVeek ending April 8, 1939, 5112 days. 
Week ending April 15, 1939, 5 days. 
\Veek ending April 22, 1939, 5112 days. 
Week ending April 29, 1939, 5112 days. 
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Week ending May 6, 1939, 51!2 days. 
Week ending May 13, 1939, 51!2 days. 
Week ending May 20, 1930, 51j2 days. 
Week ending May 27, 1939, 51!2 days. 
Week ending June 3, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending June 10, 1939, 5 days. 
Week ending June 17, 1939, 51!2 days. 
Week ending June 24, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending July 1, 1939, 6 days. 
\V eek ending July 8, 1939, 7 days. 
Week ending ,July 15, 1939, 7 days. 
Week ending tT uly 22, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending July 29, 1939, 5 days. 
\Veek ending August 5, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending August 12, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending August 19, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending August 26, 1939, 6 days. 
"\V eek ending September 2, 1939, 6 days. 
Week ending September 9, 1939, 7 days. 
\V eek ending September 16, 1939, 7 days. 
Week ending September 23, 1939, 7 days. 
Week ending September 30, 1939, 7 days. 
Week ending October 7, 1939, 7 days. 
Week ending October 14, 1939, 7 days. 
5. That plaintiff's record showed the following work 
record of the deceased with plaintiff: 
WORK RECORD OF J. FRANK JOHNSON 
SEC. No. 529-01-3273 
One year period-Oct. 15, 1938 to Oct. 14, 1939, Inc. 
1938 Week End. Amt. Hrs. Worked Days Worked 
10-15 $ 3.80 8 1 
10-22 9.99 21 3 
U.I.S. 10-19 to 31 54.60 Two wks. period 
" 11-1 to 15 
less 3 days above 
63.00 Two wks. period 
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1938 \Yeek End. Amt. Hrs. \Y or ked Days Worked 
r.r.s. 10-16 to 30 63.00 Two wk8. period 
" 1:2-1 to 13 63.00 " " " ,, 12-16 to 31 58.00 " " " 
C.P.C.1:2-31 7.13 16 2 
1939 
1-7 15.20 32 4 
1-1-l 20.90 ..J.-l 51f2 
1-21 19.00 40 5 
1-28 19.00 40 5 
2--l 3.80 8 1 
2-11 X one 
2-18 None 
2-23 18.28 381f2 5 
3--l 19.00 40 5 
3-11 . 19.12 401f2 5 
3-18 19.00 40 5 
3-25 19.00 40 5 
-l-1 19.00 40 5 
4-8 3.80 8 1 
4-15 19.00 40 5 
-l-22 19.00 40 5 
4-29 19.00 40 5 
5-6 19.00 40 5 
5-13 19.01 40 5 
5-20 19.00 40 5 
5-27 19.00 40 5 
6-3 15.20 32 4 
6-10 19.00 40 5 
6-17 19.36 403)1. 5 
6-24 20.90 44 51f2 
7-1 24.58 513)1. 6 
7-8 44.31 931/i 6 
7-15 30.53 641)1. 7 
7-22 19.24 401f2 5 
7-29 17.10 36 41/2 
8-5 17.10 36 41/2 
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1939 Week End. 
8-12 
8-19 
8-26 
9-2 
9-9 
9-16 
9-23 
9-30 
10-7 
10-14 
Amt. 
20.90 
23.04 
32.18 
36.11 
32.54 
43.10 
47.16 
39.90 
32.43 
29.92 
6 
Hrs. Worked 
44 
481!2 
673~ 
76 
681!2 
903~ 
991~ 
84 
681~ 
63 
$913.63 18951~ 
Days \Y or ked 
51f2 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
6 
6 
6. That the deceased, at the time of his injury and 
prior thereto, was being paid 471!2 cents per hour for 
his labor. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
In making its award the Commission based the same 
upon its finding that the plaintiff's business "was being 
carried on 7 days per week.'' Plaintiff contends that 
there is no evidence to support such finding, and further 
that such a finding will not support an award using as 
the basis thereof seven day employment per week; that 
the uncontradicted evidence and the only evidence, name-
ly, the stipulation of facts, shows that the usual opera-
tion of plaintiff's business was less than six days per 
week, and the basis for determining ''average weekly 
wage,'' which in turn is the basis used in determining 
benefi!s, is not the number of days plaintiff's business 
was operated at the time of the injury, but on the con-
trary is the "usual operation" of plaintiff's business. 
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ARGUl\IENT 
Sl'dion -1:2-1-6-1, ReYised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as 
amended by Chapter 51, Laws of l'tnh, 1939, provides as 
follows: 
''In case injury causes death within the pe-
riod of three years, the employer or insurance 
carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the de-
ceased as provided herein, and further benefits in 
the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(1) ***** 
(2) If there are wholly dependent persons at 
the time of the death, the payment shall be 60 per 
cent of the average weekly wage, but not to ex-
ceed a maximum of $16 per week, plus 10 per cent 
of said award for each dependent minor child 
under the age of eighteen years, up to and includ-
ing five such dependent minor children, to con-
tinue for the remainder of the period between the 
date of the death and six years after the date of 
the injury, and shall not amount to more than a 
maximum of $7,500 or less than a minimum of 
$2,000.00. 
(3) ***** 
(-1) *****" 
It being agreed that there were wholly dependent 
persons upon the deceased at the time of death, the fore-
going is the statute applicable to the instant award. Pur-
suant to it, the award in the instant case should have been 
60 per cent of the average weekly wage, plus an addition-
al 50 percent of such award for the minor children. Ac-
cordingly, in reaching the amount of the award it is nec-
c>~ary that ''the average weekly wage'' be determined. 
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Section 42-1-70, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as 
amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937, provides 
as follows: 
"The average weekly wage of the injured 
person at the time of injury shall be taken as the 
basis upon which to compute benefits. Employ-
ment shall mean pursuit in the usual trade, busi-
ness or profession of the employer. Five and 
one-half or six day employment shall mean pur-
suit in the usual trade, business or profession, the 
usual operation of which is six days or less per 
week. Seven-day employment shall mean pursuit 
in the usual trade, business or profession, the us-
ual operation of which is seven days per week. 
The average weekly wage shall be determined as 
follows: 
(1) Determine the contract of hire existing 
at the time of the injury, whether upon year, 
month, week, day, hour or piece basis. 
( 2) Determine whether the employment is 
operated on a five and one-half, six or seven day 
basis. 
(3) Determine daily wage as follows: 
(a) If the wage is on an annual basis, and the 
employment is seven days per week, divide the 
amount of the annual salary by 364. Result-
daily wage. If the employment is five and one 
half or six days per week, divide the amount of 
the annual salary by 312. Result-daily wage. 
(b) If the wage is on a monthly basis, multi-
ply monthly salary by 12 and proceed as above, 
in (a) to determine daily wage. 
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(c) If the 'Yagp is on a daily basis no rule is 
required. 
(d) If the wage is on an hourly basis, multi-
ply the pay per hour by the number of hours em-
ployment regularly operates or, if operation is not 
r~gular, use eight hours as a day. 
(e) If the wage is on a piece basis, use the 
aYerage daily earnings for a reasonable period in 
which employment has been regular, and diYide 
the amount earned by the number of days worked 
in such period. If the duration of employment 
has been too short to determine as above, then use 
the wage of an average employee, taking into con-
sideration the experience of such employee, and 
determine as above in (a). 
(f) If the wage is on part-time basis, and the 
employment is regular, extend the wage to full-
time basis, or use the wage the injured would earn 
if working full time in such employment, and de-
termine as above, in (a). 
(g) The minimum number of days per year 
to be used in determining the average weekly 
wage shall be 240. Where the number of days of 
employment exceeds 240 days per year the aver-
age weekly wage shall be determined as provided 
in Paragraph 4 hereof. 
( 4) To determine average weekly wage, if 
the employment is five days per week multiply 
the daily wage as determined by the foregoing 
method by 250 and divide by 52. If the employ-
ment is five and one-half or six days per week, 
multiply the daily wage, as determined by the 
foregoing method, by 300 and divide by 52. If 
the employment is seven days per week, multiply 
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the daily wage, as determined above, by 332 and 
divide by 52. 
( 5) To determine weekly compensation, let 
D represent daily wage: 
If 5112 or 6 days of employment per week-
D X 300 X .60 . 
= weekly compensation 
52 
If 7 days of employment per week-
D X 332 X .60 
= weekly compensation 
52 
(6) To determine daily compensation, di,,idP 
weekly compensation by 7." 
The stipulation shows that the deceased was paid 
an hourly wage of 471j2 cents, and that the number of 
hours per day he worked was irregular. Accordingly, 
subsection (3) (d) above applies; namely, his daily wage 
is to be determined by multiplying 471/2 cents an hour by 
eight hours. This results in a daily wage of $3.80, and 
is the amount used by the Commission in determining 
weekly compensation. Plaintiff does not dispute the 
correctness of using $3.80 as the '' D '' in the formula. 
The formula used by the Commission in arriving at the 
amount of deceased's weekly compensation, however, is 
the formula for seven day employment per week, name-
ly, D x 332 x .60. By using this formula (the D peing 
52 
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the daily wage of $~t80) the Commission found, upon 
increasing the result of the formula 50 percent for the 
minor children, the amount of \YPeldy eompensation in 
the sum of $~1.84. Plaintiff contends that the formula 
the Commission should haYc used i~ the formula for 51/2 
or 6 day employment per w0ck, namely, D x 300 x .60, 
52 
the D being the daily wage of $3.80. The use of thus 
formula results, when such result is increased by fifty 
percent for the minor children, in weekly compensation 
of $19.73, which amount, plaintiff submits, is the correct 
amount of weekly compensation that the Commission 
::-:hould haYe a-warded. 
As to whether the formula for 5Y2 or 6 days of em-
ployment per week should be used, as claimed by the 
plaintiff, or whether the formula for 7 days of employ-
ment per week, as used by the Commission, should be 
used as the basis of determining weekly compensation, 
depends upon the interpretation of Section 42-1-70, su-
pra. It will be noted that such section contains the fol-
lowing language : 
"Five and one-half or six-day employment 
shall mean pursuit in the usual trade, business or 
profession, the usual operation of which is six 
days or less per week. Seven-day employment 
shall mean pursuit in the usual trade, business or 
profession, the usual operation of which is seven 
days per week.'' 
In other words, if the usual operation of plaintiff's 
lm~iness is six days or less per week, the deceased's em-
ployment in connection therewith is ''five and one-half 
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or six day employment,'' while if the usual operation of 
plaintiff's business is seven days per week, the de-
ceased's employment in connection therewith is ''seven 
day employment,'' as those terms are used in the fore-
going section of the statute. In order to determine the 
usual operation of plaintiff's business reference need 
only be made to the stipulation of facts, wherein the work 
record of plaintiff for 54 weeks immediately prior to the 
deceased's injury is set out. It therein appears that dur-
ing such 54 week period the operation of plaintiff's bus-
iness consisted of 19 five day weeks, 16 five and one-half 
day weeks, 11 six day weeks, and 8 seven day weeks. 
But eight weeks out of such 54 week period did plaintiff's 
business operate seven days per week, while 46 weeks 
out of such 34 week period plaintiff's business operated 
six days or less per week. A simple mathematical cal-
culation shows that the average operating week for 
plaintiff during such period was less than 5.69 days per 
week. It is obvious, therefore, that the usual operation 
of plaintiff's business was less than six days per week, 
and the formula that should have been used by the Com-
mission is D x 300 x .60, and the amount of compensa-
52 
tion that should have been awarded per week is $19.73. 
It is true that plaintiff's business was operating 7 days 
per week at the time of the injury to deceased, but the 
statute does not make that the test. The test_ is the 
llsual operation, not the factual operation at any partic-
ular time. 
There can be no question as to the meaning of the 
word ''usual.'' It does not mean that which is out of 
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the ordinary, but rather that which is customary. This 
plaintiff, at the time of the injury, as well as prior and 
subsequent thereto, was engaged in canning, and it is a 
matter of common knowledge that in the very nature 
of things a canning busines involves a seasonal opera-
tion. Concerned as it is with seasonal and highly per-
ishable agricultural products, which when ripe must be 
speedily processed, it has on that account periods of 
operation, e-..;en during the canning season, which are out 
of the ordinary course of business and which are usually 
spoken of as peak periods. Such peak periods, one of 
which is shown by the stipulation as occuring at the 
time Qf the accident in question, cannot, by any stretch 
of language, be con trued to be the plaintiff's normal 
period of operation even during the canning season itself, 
much less its usual annual operation. 
That the Commission, in making its award, mis-
construed the statutory test is apparent in its findings 
of fact. The only fact found by the Commission relative 
to the operation of plaintiff's business is found in Par-
agraph IV of such findings of fact, namely: 
''The employer's business (at the time of 
deceased's injury) was being carried on 7 days 
per week.'' 
No finding as to the usual operation of plaintiff's bus-
iness was made-but only the finding with respect to 
the operation at the time of the injury. 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we respectfully submit that the find-
ings of fact will not support the award made, nor any 
award for that matter, for the reason that there is a 
total failure on the part of the Commission to find with 
respect to the ''usual operation'' of plaintiff's business; 
and we further submit, that if the finding made by the 
Commission should be construed as a sufficient finding 
of the necessary fact, the same will not support the 
award made for the reason that the uncontradicted evi-
dence shows that the usual operation of plaintiff's bus-
iness was less than six days per week. 
. . ~-
Respectfully submitted, 
DeVINE, HOWELL & STINE 
NEIL R. OLl\ISTEAD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff . 
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